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Brown: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I. THE DEATH PENALTY
In State v. Rodgers' the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the South Carolina death penalty statute,2 which requires a
bifurcated trial' before the death sentence may be imposed, could
1. 270 S.C. 285, 242 S.E.2d 215 (1978). Rodgers was one of six cases consolidated for
purposes of appeal. In addition to Rodgers were State v. Cason, State v. MacPhee, State

v. Allen, State v. Wakefield, and State v. Gaskins.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
3. The bifurcated trial requirement mandates a separate proceeding for sentencing

following the defendant's conviction in a capital case. The purpose of this survey section
is not to analyze the entire death penalty statute, but only to examine its retrospective
application; however, a brief discussion of the statute and the bifurcation provisions is
undertaken below.
The sentencing procedure is found at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Cum. Supp. 1978),
which provides as follows:
(A) A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for parole
until the service of twenty years, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
Provided, however, that notwithstanding the provisions of this section, under
no circumstances shall a female who is pregnant with child be executed so long
as she is in that condition.
(B) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the
court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding
shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable
after the lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant. If the trial
jury has been waived by the defendant and the State, or if the defendant
pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before the court.
In the sentencing proceeding, the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence
in extenuation, mitigation or aggravation of the punishment. Only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant in writing
prior to the trial shall be admissible. This section shall not be construed to
authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of South Carolina or the applicable laws
of either. The State, the defendant and his counsel shall be permitted to present
arguments for or against the sentence of death. The defendant and his counsel
shall have the closing argument regarding the sentence imposed.
(C) The judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the
jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or
allowed by law and any of the following statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(a) Aggravating circumstances:
(1) Murder was committed while in the commission of the following
crimes or acts: (a) rape, (b) assault with intent to ravish, (c) kidnapping, (d)
burglary, (e) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, (f) larceny with use of
a deadly weapon, (g) housebreaking, and (h) killing by poison and (i) physical
torture;
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(2) Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction
for murder;
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another,
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, or other officer of the court during or because of the exercise of
his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
(b) Mitigating, [sic] circumstances:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction
involving the use of violence against another person.
(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired;
(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the murder;
(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
The statutory instructions as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury,
if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and
signed by all members of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge
shall make such designation. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in this section is so found, the death penalty shall
not be imposed. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a
recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to
death. The trial judge, prior to imposing the death penalty, shall find as an
affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted under the evidence of the
case and was not a result of prejudice, passion, or any other arbitrary factor.
Where a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the court shall
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. In the event that all members of
the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as
to whether or not the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found
guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment. The jury shall not recommend the death penalty if the vote for such penalty is not unanimous.
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 14-7-1020, in cases involving capital punishment any person called as a juror shall be examined by the attorney
for the defense.
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not be applied retrospectively. The court held, therefore, that the
death penalty could not be imposed upon defendants who had
been convicted before June 8, 1977, the effective date of the statute.
Rodgers should be considered in light of recent judicial interpretations and statutory changes in South Carolina's capital punishment law.' Prior to 1974, the South Carolina Code provided
that one convicted of murder be sentenced to death unless the
jury, by special verdict, recommended mercy, in which case the
punishment would be reduced to life imprisonment. 5 In a 1972
case, Furmanv. Georgia,I the United States Supreme Court held
that capital punishment statutes such as the South Carolina statute, which allowed the judge and jury broad discretion in imposing or withholding the death penalty, violated the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. The South Carolina Supreme Court
took cognizance of Furman in State v. Gibson,7 remanding Gibson to the trial court for resentencing to life imprisonment.
In an effort to restore the death penalty, the General Assembly amended the death penalty statute in 1974. 8 The new statute
made the death penalty mandatory under certain well-defined
circumstances, thereby eliminating jury discretion and jury consideration of mitigating circumstances. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the statute, as amended, complied with
Furman.' A subsequent decision of the United States Supreme
(E) In every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime
which may be punishable by death, a person may not be disqualified, excused
or excluded from service as a juror therein by reason of his beliefs or attitudes
against capital punishment unless such beliefs or attitudes would render him
unable to return a verdict of guilty according to law.
Id.
The murder defendant also is provided various safeguards prior to trial. Id. § 16-326. Additionally, the defendant has the right to make the last argument at trial and at
sentencing. Id. § 16-3-28.
Whenever the death penalty is imposed, the sentence will be reviewed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The Code provides strict standards for appellate review of the
sentence, which are in addition to any direct appeal available to the defendant. Id. § 163-25.
4. For a more detailed analysis of events leading to the passage of the present statutes, see CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 29 S.C.L. REv. 80, 86-90
(1977).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. 259 S.C. 459, 192 S.E.2d 720 (1972).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Act].
9. State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 185, 222 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1976).
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Court, Woodson v. North Carolina,0 held that statutes that mandate the death penalty in certain specific circumstances, but do
not allow either the judge or jury the discretion to impose a lesser
sentence, also violated the eighth amendment. The South Carolina death penalty statute was similar to the statute invalidated
in Woodson. In State v. Rumsey," a 1976 decision, the South
Carolina Supreme Court recognized this similarity 2 and held the
death penalty provision unconstitutional. South Carolina was
again without a valid death penalty provision.
In a further effort to reinstate the death penalty, the General
Assembly again amended the death penalty statute in 1977. 3 The
1977 Act was closely patterned after other states' statutes that
had been declared constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court." By providing a bifurcated trial with a number of procedural safeguards for the defendant,' 5 the current statute strikes a
balance between the broad discretion condemned in Furmanand
the absolute lack of discretion rejected in Woodson. In establishing "objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death,"' the
legislature created a death penalty provision capable of withstanding constitutional attack.
All of the defendants in Rodgers were tried, convicted and
sentenced to death under the 1974 Act, but prior to the Supreme
Court ruling in Woodson and prior to the passage of the 1977 Act.
Each of the death sentences was invalid under Rumsey. Two of
the defendants had been resentenced to life imprisonment in accordance with Rumsey after passage of the 1977 Act. The other
four defendants were awaiting resentencing.
In Rodgers, the South Carolina attorney general argued that
when all defendants were or would be resentenced, the only valid
statute for sentencing persons convicted of murder was the 1977
Act. The state further argued that two defendants were not resentenced in compliance with the statute then in effect and that
all six defendants should be resentenced in accordance with the
10.
11.
12.
13.

428 U.S. 280 (1976), accord, Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976).
Id. at 238, 226, S.E.2d at 895.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Cum. Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977

Act].
14. E.g., Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
15. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
16. 428 U.S. at 303.
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1977 Act.'7 The crux of the state's position was that resentencing
under the 1977 Act could yield the death penalty, but resentencing under the 1974 Act could yield only life imprisonment in light
of Rumsey.
The state in Rodgers placed principal reliance on Dobbert v.
8 In Dobbert, defendant was charged with the murders of
Florida.'
two of his children. At the time of the murders, Florida law provided that a person convicted of a capital felony was to be punished by death 9 unless mercy was recommended by the jury 2°-a
law similar to the statutory provisions existing in South Carolina
prior to 1974. Before Dobbert was brought to trial, the existing
Florida death penalty provision was invalidated' in light of
Furman and a new death penalty provision, 22 the constitutionality of which was subsequently upheld, 23 was enacted. The Florida statute as enacted is essentially the same as the current South
Carolina statute. Dobbert was eventually tried, convicted and
sentenced to death under the valid death penalty provision. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding "that the
changes in the law are procedural, and on the whole ameliorative,
and that there is no ex post facto violation. 21 4 The state in
Rodgers adopted this position and argued that because the
changes between the former and present South Carolina death
penalty statutes are "procedural and remedial in effect, the
[1977 Act] may operate retrospectively."
Defendants in Rodgers relied on two basic arguments. First,
the South Carolina legislature did not intend the death penalty
statute to operate retroactively, but rather intended it only to
apply to defendants tried and sentenced after June 8, 1977, the
effective date of the statute. Second, the application of the sentencing provisions to the defendants, without benefit of each procedural safeguard now afforded a defendant before and during
trial, would deny the defendants due process of law guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment and by the South Carolina Consti17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

270 S.C. at 290-91, 242 S.E.2d at 217.
432 U.S. 282 (1977).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (1971).
Id. § 921.141 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1974 and Cum. Supp. 1978).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
432 U.S. at 292.
270 S.C. at 292, 242 S.E.2d at 218.
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tution.2s Both arguments distinguished Rodgers from Dobbert
and the South Carolina Supreme Court found those arguments
persuasive.
The court found nothing in the statute to suggest that the
legislature intended retroactive application. The legislature was
fully aware of the invalidity of the 1974 Act when the 1977 Act
was passed. The legislature also had the general power to back
date the effective date of the statute27 to apply to persons similarly situated to defendants, although such back dating would
have raised serious constitutional questions. Instead, the bill was
to become effective when signed by the Governor, June 8, 1977.
The supreme court, relying on this clear legislative intent, held
that the death penalty could not be applied to defendants who
were tried before June 8, 1977.28 This holding is consistent with
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dobbert that
a murder defendant may be tried and sentenced to death under
a statute that was not in effect at the time of the commission of
the crime, provided that the new law "neither made criminal a
theretofor innocent act, nor aggravated a crime previously committed, nor provided greater punishment, nor changed the proof
necessary to convict."2 9
The South Carolina Supreme Court was equally persuaded
by the due process claims asserted by defendants. The court held
that a number of procedural safeguards guaranteed under the
1977 Act" would be irrevocably lost to the defendants if they were
CONST. art. I, § 3.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-7-10 (1976).

26. S.C.

28. 270 S.C. at 293, 242 S.E.2d at 218.
29. 432 U.S. at 293 (discussing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884)).
30. These safeguards were summarized by the court:
(1) The State must give 30 days notification prior to the trial of the case of its
intention to seek the death penalty; defense counsel is also excused from
all trial duties ten days prior to the term of court in which the trial is to
be held. (§ 16-3-26(A)).
(2) The court shall appoint two attorneys to represent the defendant if he is
unable to afford counsel, and the county in which the indictment was
returned shall pay attorneys' fees up to $1,500.00 (§ 16-3-26(B)).
(3) The court shall authorize up to $2,000.00 for investigative, expert or other
services, if found to be necessary. (§ 16-3-26(C)).
(4) The attorney for the defense shall be allowed to examine any person called
as a juror. (§ 16-3-26(D)).
(5) Specific procedures are provided for excusing a juror for cause based on his
attitude toward capital punishment. (§ 16-3-20(E)).
(6) The defendant or his counsel shall have the last argument during both the
guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. (§§ 16-3-20(B) & 16-3-28).
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resentenced under the new statute. This, said the court, factually
distinguished Rodgers from Dobbert because in the latter case,
Dobbert was both tried and sentenced under a single statute,
which gave him the benefit of3 1 all statutory safeguards that attached during the trial stages.

Twenty-six men were sentenced to death under the 1974Act;
fifteen of those were resentenced to life imprisonment under that
32
Act after Rumsey but before the effective date of the 1977 Act.
The court in Rodgers, in ruling that others similarly situated
should also be resentenced under the 1974 Act, reached the only
rational decision on the matter.
II.

JURY CHARGE OF PRESUMPTION FOR FAILURE TO CALL A
MATERIAL WITNESS

In State v. Hammond33 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that it will no longer reverse a case, civil or criminal, for
failure of the trial judge to charge the jury that "a presumption
might be drawn that a witness present in court, who did not
testify and who had information relative to the case, if called,
would have testified contrary" to what the party failing to call the
witness might have desired.3 4 With this holding, the court buried
a ruling of long-standing confusion and little utility.
Defendant Hammond was charged with possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute and possession of gambling paraphernalia. At trial, after the state rested, Hammond announced that he
would present no evidence. Additionally, he requested that the
judge charge the jury that a presumption may be drawn that a
police officer, present in court but not called, might have testified
adversely to the state. The judge indicated that the requested
(7) The sentencing proceeding is to be conducted by the trial judge before the
trial jury, and is to follow the conviction closely in time. (§ 16-3-20(B)).
(8) The State may only introduce such evidence in aggravation as has been
made known to the defendant in writing prior to the trial. (§ 16-3-20(B)).
(9) The jury must designate the aggravating circumstances which it found
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial judge, prior to imposing sentence,
must find as an affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted
under the evidence and that it was not a result of prejudice, passion, or
any other arbitrary factor. (§ 16-3-20(C)).
270 S.C. at 291-92, 242 S.E.2d at 218.
31. Id. at 291, 242 S.E.2d at 217-18.
32. Brief of Appellant Allen at 20.
33. 270 S.C. 347, 242 S.E.2d 411 (1978).
34. Id. at 355, 242 S.E.2d at 415.
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charge was proper, but instead of so charging the jury, allowed
the state, over defendant's objection, to reopen its case and call
the officer to testify. The supreme court ruled that there was no
error in allowing the state to reopen its case.
In so doing, the court seized the opportunity to comment
upon the propriety of the requested charge. Such jury charges
have been deemed appropriate by the court in only the most
restrictive circumstances in both criminal35 and civil" cases. The
court, five years earlier, had questioned its own position in this
matter:
Upon review of our own decisions, as well as authorities from
other jurisdictions, we entertain grave doubt as to the propriety,
in a criminal case, of the rule of an adverse inference from the
failure to produce a material witness. Certainly, a charge of the
proposition to the jury on behalf of either the state or the defense
is not warranted except under most unusual circumstances
37

Having previously alerted the trial bar and bench to a possible
change in the law,3" the court in Hammond eliminated the requirement that the charge be given.
The action of the court in no way impairs the right of counsel,
in closing argument, to comment upon the failure of the opposing
party to call a witness;"9 therefore, any potential detriment suffered by a party because the presumption was not charged can
be minimized or eliminated. The protection of the parties' rights
and the elimination of a jury charge that "brings about more
problems than solutions"40 make the supreme court's action in
Hammond commendable.
III.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

"It is well settled that searches conducted without a warrant
are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant re35. E.g., State v. Batson, 261 S.C. 128, 198 S.E.2d 517 (1973).
36. E.g., Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors, Inc., 261 S.C. 469, 200 S.E.2d 681 (1973);
Davis v. Sparks, 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545 (1959).
37. State v. Batson, 261 S.C. at 138, 198 S.E.2d at 522 (1973).
38. Id. See also, Baker v. Port City Steel Erectors, Inc., 261 S.C. 469, 200 S.E.2d 631
(1973).
39. 270 S.C. at 356, 242 S.E.2d at 416. See also State v. Peden, 157 S.C. 459, 154 S.E.
658 (1930).
40. 270 S.C. at 357, 242 S.E.2d at 416.
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quirement is presented . . 4""
The recognized exceptions to
this rule include: "(1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) 'hot
pursuit', (3) 'stop and frisk', (4) 'automobile exception', (5) the
'plain view' doctrine, and (6) consent. 4 2
Six months before summarizing the law pertaining to warrantless searches as quoted above, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. Shelton" regrettably created another exception
to the warrant requirement. The court in Shelton outlined the
authority and responsibility of the trial judge to preserve security
and to secure orderly proceedings in the courtroom. The court
then held that in the exercise of this authority the judge "is not
inhibited by the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures is inapplicable to a courtroom ....
"I'
In Shelton, defendant and his wife were involved in a foreclosure proceeding. Several days before Shelton's scheduled appearance, the trial judge received reliable information, conceded by
the state to be probable cause,45 that defendant carried a gun and
had threatened several persons, including a local attorney. On the
date set for the hearing, Shelton arrived at the courthouse. At the
judge's direction, he was escorted from the hallway into the courtroom and was searched without a warrant in the presence of the
court. The search yielded a loaded pistol. This evidence was used,
over defendant's objection, in his subsequent conviction for carrying a firearm in a public building.4"
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1978).
Id. n.1.
270 S.C. 577, 243 S.E.2d 455 (1978).
Id. at 580, 243 S.E.2d at 457.
Brief of Respondent at 1.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420 (1976). The statute provides:
Any person who carries into any private or public school, college or university building or any publicly owned building, or has in his possession in the area
immediately adjacent to such buildings, a firearm of any kind, without the
express permission of the authorities in charge of the buildings, or who, upon
entering such buildings, or the areas immediately adjacent thereto, displays,
brandishes or threatens others with a firearm shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars
or be in prison not more than five years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to any guard, law enforcement
officer or member of the armed forces, or to any student of military science, or
to any married student residing in apartments provided by such private or
public school whose presence with a weapon in or around a particular building
is authorized by persons legally responsible for the security of such buildings.
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The search of Shelton did not fall under any specific or welldelineated exception to the warrant requirement. These exceptions fall into three basic categories: "consent searches, a very
limited class of routine searches, and certain searches conducted
under circumstances of haste, that render the obtaining of a warrant impracticable."" Counsel for both sides argued the applicability of various recognized exceptions such as consent search,'
search incident to arrest,4 9 and "stop and frisk" search.? The
court either chose not to rely on these arguments or found them
unpersuasive. In holding that the gun was properly admitted in
evidence, the supreme court relied solely on the "inherent power
[of the judge] to preserve order in his court and to see that
justice is not obstructed by any person or persons." 5' The soundness of this policy cannot be questioned, but the method of effectuating the policy in this particular case is extremely questionable.
The court relied on State v. Smith52 and State v. Gore53 to
support the proposition that in matters of courtroom security, the
appellate court reviewing the judge's action will only consider th6
"reasonable necessity for the security taken. '54 This reliance was
misplaced.
First, Smith and Gore are totally inapposite. The central
issue in both Smith and Gore was whether a defendant's right to
a fair trial was unduly prejudiced by excessive security precautions taken during the trial.55 Moreover, the precautions taken in
Smith and Gore were of general application-either searching all
persons who entered the courtroom or providing officers for general courtroom security.59 The concern of the judge in Shelton was
not for general courtroom security nor was the concern of such ill47. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353
(1974).
48. Brief of Appellant at 3; Brief of Respondent at 1-2.
49. Brief of Appellant at 2.
50. Id. at 3-4; Brief of Respondent at 2-3.
51. 270 S.C. at 580, 243 S.E.2d at 457.
52. 259 S.C. 309, 191 S.E.2d 638 (1972).
53. 257 S.C. 330, 185 S.E.2d 826 (1971).
54. 270 S.C. at 581, 243 S.E.2d at 457.
55. 259 S.C. at 311-12, 191 S.E.2d at 638-39; 257 S.C. at 333, 185 S.E.2d at 828.
56. 259 S.C. at 312, 191 S.E.2d at 639; 257 S.C. at 333, 185 S.E.2d at 828. See also
United States v. Miller, 468 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 935 (1973);
Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972); Jessmore, The Courthouse Search, 21
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 797 (1974).
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defined scope and magnitude to render a search warrant impracticable. On the contrary, the judge's security concern involved
only defendant Shelton and the judge had ample time and sufficient probable cause to secure a warrant.
Second, contrary to the wording of the court's opinion in
Shelton,5 7 reasonableness of a search is not the correct test to be
applied in resolving fourth amendment challenges. Absent one or
more of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
appropriate test is whether it was reasonable to secure a warrant
not whether the search was reasonable. 8 In Shelton, it was reasonable to secure a warrant, one was not obtained, and the evidence should have been excluded from the subsequent prosecution.
That the person directing the search was a judicial officer can
in no way substitute for the warrant requirement. The fact that
probable cause to obtain a warrant unquestionably existed or that
any magistrate would have issued a search warrant is insufficient
to comply with the procedural safeguards developed to preserve
fourth amendment protections. Regardless of the objectivity of
the judge ordering the search, the requisite "neutral and detached" magistrate requirement per se has not been met.5"
The unfortunate effect of the Shelton decision is that the
courtroom, long the place to which individuals have successfully
turned to have their constitutional rights vindicated, has become
an enclave in which one of the important protections guaranteed
by the fourth amendment does not apply. It is hoped that the
reasoning of the court in State v. Shelton is an aberration soon
to be rectified.
Harry D. Brown
57. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
58. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1977).
59. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971).
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